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The European Commission has two formal requirements for developing multi-annual management plan policies: evaluation of the past
performance of existing plans and impact assessments (IAs) of the potential beneﬁts of new proposals. The new policies require the
evaluation of ﬁshery management in terms of three speciﬁc criteria: (i) effectiveness, i.e. the best method to achieve the objectives; (ii)
efﬁciency, the cost-effectiveness, and proportionality; and (iii) consistency, i.e. limiting trade-offs across economic, social, and environ-
mental domains. To develop policy, there is a need to collect relevant information, then to conduct appropriate analyses that provide
documentation to support the policy objectives. This paper discusses the data requirements for good environmental, economic, and
social understanding of ﬁshery dynamics and management, describing how ﬁshery data are currently linked to the analytical and man-
agement evaluation process using examples from 2009 and 2010. The type of information currently used is considered, along with the
timetable of data availability, and its effect on historical evaluation and IAs, which are now formally required when any changes to
legislation are proposed in the European Union, including following stakeholder consultation. The possibilities and future needs for
such data are discussed.
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Introduction
Scientific advice and European Union (EU) Fisheries policy are
closely coupled. The Common Fisheries Policy [CFP; European
Commission (EC), 2002] explicitly requires “taking into account
available scientific, technical and economic advice”, and in par-
ticular, the reports of the Scientific, Technical, and Economic
Committee for Fisheries (STECF), which is formally established
under that regulation. The EC annually formulates its harvest
policy for the following year and informs Member States by a com-
munication (e.g. EC, 2008), which defines how the scientific advice
will be used to set fishing opportunities and how the process can
include further requests for scientific and economic advice from
STECF. Within this framework, multi-annual plans developed
with the help of scientific advice are the basis for setting some of
the fishing opportunities. These plans are perhaps the best
examples of good practice in European fishery management
[see, for example, the case of North Sea (NS) herring since 1997,
reviewed in Simmonds, 2007, and the NS plaice and sole plans
reviewed in STECF (2010a)]. Since 2001, the EC has established
a programme of data collection [through the Data Collection
Regulation (DCR; EC, 2001) and the Data Collection
Framework (DCF; EC, 2007) in support of biological and
economic aspects of policy. Here, we consider how the multi-
annual aspects of fishery policy and regulation lead to a formal leg-
islative need for historical evaluation (HE) of past policies and
impact assessments (IAs) of new proposals (see detailed descrip-
tion below), together with the requirement for relevant data.
Policy drivers
The overall objectives for fisheries under the CFP are those of sus-
tainability. The World Summit on Sustainable Development held
in Johannesburg (Anon., 2002; paragraph 31a of the implemen-
tation section) stated that there would be a “commitment to
restoring [fish] stocks to levels that can produce maximum sus-
tainable yields (MSY) by 2015”. The EC’s approach to sustainable
development is stated in a general framework (EC, 2009a) that
includes a requirement to carry out IAs of any proposal with a sig-
nificant impact on EU policy. Following the Lisbon Treaty which
came into force in 2009, this requirement must follow the ordinary
legislative procedure, formerly known as the Codecision
Procedure (i.e. between the European Council and Parliament),
by which directives and regulations are adopted. This procedure
now applies to all fisheries legislation, except for the annual
setting of fishing opportunities. For new or revised legislation
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under this procedure, the EC submits a legislative proposal to the
Parliament and Council. This submission includes a requirement
for an HE of past policy and an IA of the new proposal.
HEs and IAs in the EU
The IA is a key tool to ensure that EC initiatives are coherent with
other legislation. EU legislation is expected to be prepared based
on transparent, comprehensive, and balanced evidence. This is a
formal approach giving the steps to be followed when preparing
policy and/or legislative initiatives. The advantages and disadvan-
tages of various policy options are presented, assessing their poten-
tial impacts as evidence for political decision-makers. Conducting
such an IA is a key feature of developing EC initiatives, and the
College of Commissioners will take the IA report into account
when making decisions. The IA is therefore an aid to political
decision-making, which it supports but does not replace,
because the adoption of a policy and/or legislative initiative is
always a political decision made by the College alone.
EC policy-decisions must be based on sound analysis sup-
ported by the best data available. The EC has a specified approach
to IA (EC, 2009b), which extends beyond fisheries per se. The main
analytical steps in preparing legislation are:
(i) identifying the problem (nature and extent, key actors,
drivers, and underlying causes);
(ii) defining the objectives (with coherence at several levels, from
general to specific operational matters, consistent with exist-
ing EU policies and strategies, e.g. the Lisbon Treaty, sustain-
able development strategies, and respect for basic rights);
(iii) developing the main policy options (a shortlist of potentially
valid options; distinguishing between them under the pro-
portionality principle—see below) and measuring against
criteria for effectiveness, efficiency, and coherence;
(iv) analysing their expected impacts (economic, social, and
environmental; who is affected and in what way; assessing
the impacts against the baseline of no-action in qualitative,
quantitative, and monetary terms, and the administrative
burden; considering the risks and uncertainties in the
policy choices, including potential simplification and any
obstacles to transposition or compliance);
(v) comparing the options (the positive and negative impacts of
each one).
(The principle of proportionality is a political maxim that states
that no layer of government should take any action that exceeds
that which is necessary to achieve the objective of government,
regardless of intent of objective. It is a basic principle of EU law.
According to this principle, the EU may only act to exactly the
extent needed to achieve its objectives, and no further. This prin-
ciple has underpinned the European Communities since their
inception in 1957. In the currently applicable primary law, the
principle of proportionality is clearly formulated in the third para-
graph of Article 5 of the Treaty establishing the European
Community as “Any action by the Community shall not go
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this
Treaty”. This principle is also explicitly specified in the new
Treaty of Lisbon).
Scientists produce a technical report, from which the EC will
write the IA report and choose the preferred options. Further,
within this process, the EC has obligations to consult stakeholders,
and in the cases of fishery legislation to obtain the opinion of
STECF. Multi-annual management plans are developed with the
three CFP objectives in mind, i.e. biological, social, and economic
sustainability. To evaluate the past performance of plans and the
impact of new proposals, the STECF has developed a generic
approach (STECF, 2010a, b). There is a common structure to
both HEs and IAs. HEs deal with past performance, and addition-
ally compare what would have happened in hypothetical alterna-
tive scenarios had no, or different, actions been adopted. To
complement this, IAs evaluate similar questions but look to the
future. For simplicity, in the sections below, we discuss mostly
HEs, but we also consider aspects of IAs where they are different.
The main criteria
Deﬁning the problem statement and objectives of
a plan
This means that the scope of the problem to be addressed must be
defined—why action is required and the link to any background
studies or information. Although the general objective will be
the CFP and MSY criteria, there can also be specific objectives in
terms of other desired outcomes, often with a time-scale (e.g.
achieving exploitation target F in X years). Note that it is not poss-
ible to evaluate the performance of a plan without operational
objectives in this form. Following discussion among managers,
scientists, and stakeholders, STECF selects an initial set of objec-
tives to compare different plans (STECF, 2010c). For each
general objective, specific parameters are identified as the indi-
cators to be measured or estimated. An example of the correspon-
dence between general objectives under each of the three
overarching criteria of the CFP, and specific objectives with ident-
ified parameters taken from STECF (2010c), is given in Table 1.
A good source of information on the selection of appropriate
biological, economic, or social indicators and targets reference
points is a full management strategy evaluation (Butterworth,
2007; ICES, 2008). However, this level of complexity is not
always possible, and the MSY policy may instead be based solely
on relevant biological targets such as FMSY, the fishing mortality
corresponding to MSY. Reconciling multiple objectives can be dif-
ficult (Horan et al., 1999), and it may require the allocation of
weights to the different objectives if they are in conflict or imply
different strategies. The EC implements the MSY strategy though
a target fishing mortality, with biomass having a secondary role.
This follows from the view that the management actions aim to
control fishing activities, not the stocks directly. Although the
stocks are obviously affected by fishing pressure, they are also
subject to environmental influences outside the control of man-
agement. Ko¨ster et al. (2003) reviewed a range of relevant variables,
and although these may explain the stock response, if they are
unpredictable in the medium or longer term, then the outcome
for the stock is also unpredictable (ICES, 2007).
Estimating FMSY can be done in several ways, which result from
different assumptions and data and may give different target
values. ICES has specified a framework (ICES, 2010), but it is
not yet fully mature. An example for NS plaice is illustrated in
Figure 1. The data required are the stock assessment, including
information on both landings and discards. The evaluation
method is that described in ICES (2010). It uses multiple stock–
recruit relationships (Simmonds et al., 2011) that include both
Ricker and hockey-stick (segmented regression) functional forms
(Needle, 2002), and a stochastic component in which 1000
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different plausible populations, each with its own functional form
and stochastic component, are derived from the assessment data.
The use of multiple relationships therefore includes uncertainty
in the knowledge of recruitment processes. Equilibrium is
obtained (after 100 years), and the results for constant-F exploita-
tion are plotted (Figure 1). MSY for the various populations
occurs at different values of F, expressing the uncertainty in its esti-
mation. Also, because of the substantial discards in the plaice
fishery (.50% by number), the catch peaks at F ¼ 0.45, which
is much higher than that for maximum landings, F ¼ 0.25.
Estimates of FMSY from the maximum mean landings and the
median of the FMSY distribution are similar. Maximummean land-
ings give a choice based on the integration of information over all
values of F. The data needed to support this analysis are from a
converged part of a fish stock assessment, but, importantly, must
include discards as well as landings; comparing the F-values for
maximum landings and catches shows the importance of having
reliable discard data.
The choice of tactical methods
The term tactical methods refers to the different tools (and their
measures) to be used to reach objectives. Tactics might be such
aspects as TACs (total allowable catches), effort controls in terms
of capacity or activity, closed areas, or technical aspects of
fishing gear, such as mesh size. It is essential to select coherent
operational objectives in terms of controllable and measurable
variables that give information on implementation success
against realizable criteria, such as changes in fishing effort and
capacity, or TACs, with interannual stability criteria.
A plan should first be evaluated to see if it has in fact been
implemented, before discussing its success in terms of the biologi-
cal, economic, or social outcomes. For instance, if TACs are
expected to control catches, has this been the case? If there
were capacity or activity contols limiting days at sea, have the
capacity changes been implemented, have days at sea controls con-
trolled effort, or have too many derogations been granted so that
the measures would be expected to be ineffective anyway? If there
has been no reduction in fishing mortality, and there are no
benefits in biological or economic responses because the planned
reduction of landings or fishing effort has been unsuccessful, the
issue may be mostly one of tactics rather than the aims and objec-
tives of the plan. Where a plan has failed, identifying whether the
problem is a failure of tactics or a failure of stock response is basic
to understanding where different approaches are needed. The
review of the recovery plan for southern hake and Nephrops
fisheries (STECF, 2010f) shows that under the plan, there is no
reduction of fishing mortality. The landings controls have been
ineffective in controlling TAC, and effort reductions have been
ineffective because they were too small, allowing vessels to
switch to more effective gears and allowing derogations for large
fleets that have small catch per vessel but a substantial proportion
of the total. In this case, the tactics have not been implemented,
and a change to the plan that did not address this would not be
expected to be perform any better.
Deﬁning any overriding considerations of options
It is important to identify whether there are any significant parts of
any options being proposed or evaluated that have failed in the
past, or are unlikely to contribute to the overall objectives in the
future. Removing unnecessary features, simplifying approaches,
or replacing those that do not appear to work is part of good man-
agement, and in the context of IA is an important part of the
procedure.
Environmental (biological) effects of plans
The expected impact on catches or landings of any of the following
options in the plan should be shown:
(a) Identifying catch and effort limitations, either through TAC
or effort management, expected from the different options.
Evaluate whether any technical measures (e.g. closed areas
or gear restrictions) in the options have delivered the results
expected when a plan was proposed.
(b) The impact of control and enforcement measures – e.g. entry
and exit rules, or allocation rights, and particularly the impact
of any exemptions.
There is a need to consider what was or is the expected fishery
response to the different options. Possible response strategies of
fleets include shifts to other stocks or species, to other gears or
me´tiers, changes in discard and slippage practice, and other behav-
ioural issues.
For the NS sole and plaice fishery, there has been a movement
of fishing effort towards the main landing ports, into areas with
larger proportions of sole in the catches (STECF, 2010a); this
may be attributable to higher fuel prices, but there is a consequent
slower reduction in F for sole than for plaice (ICES, 2010). The
data needs are spatially resolved catch, landings and effort data
by fleet, information on species selectivity and catch compositions,
and changes in fleet capacity. Modelling requires information on
Table 1. An example of the correspondence of identiﬁed parameters and their conditions, related to the conceptual objectives under the
main criteria of the EU’s CFP.
Type of objective Conceptual objectives Parameters to monitor Targets or limits
Environmental/biological MSY (2015 and later) Fishing mortality (1) Ftarget ¼ FMSY
GES (2020 and later) (2) If multiple objectives, F ≤ FMSY
Economic (for both ﬂeet
and infrastructure)
Maximum economic yield Resource rent (gross value-added
net proﬁt)
(1) Maximizing resource rent
(2) Ensure that a minimum resource rent is
achievable across a three-year period
Social Potential employment and
quality of employment
Revenue (GVA, as an indicator of
potential employment)
(1) Maximum revenue
(2) Maximum GVA
Efﬁciency Management/resource costs Value of ﬁshery, costs of
management and enforcement
Cost/beneﬁt ratio of management is
maximized
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changes in fishing practices. Past adaptations of the fisheries may
indicate future changes.
Evaluation of the effects of the plan on the stock
This involves evaluating the stock response to changes in the fish-
eries resulting from the plan, and checking whether the targets and
other reference points specified in the plan are consistent with
current knowledge, and whether the objective of achieving MSY
by 2015 is attainable. Are the options likely to be considered
precautionary, and if not, why not? Finally, are all the measures
in the plan required, or would something simpler achieve the
objectives?
The data needs are similar to those of stock assessment.
Modelling requires good understanding of the stock dynamics to
test the different scenarios; this may be possible even without an
agreed assessment, using only survey data or a converged VPA to
provide realistic stock parameters (see, for example, Roel and De
Oliveira, 2007; EC, 2009c).
Figure 1. Estimation of biological MSY targets. Results of simulated equilibrium exploitation of NS plaice against age 2–6 ﬁshing mortality
(F2–6). The model is based on recruitment data from 1957 to 2007 with observed growth and maturation rates from 2004 to 2008. The
recruitment model includes both the hockey-stick and Ricker formulations: (a) recruitment; (b) SSB; (c) catches (black curve) and landings
(red curve). The dots in (a)–(c) are historical observations of recruitment, SSB, catches, and F. Black lines are simulation quantiles at levels of
0.025, 0.05, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 0.95, and 0.975; the green line shows F for a 5% risk of SSB , Blim derived in (d). (d) Risks and FMSY: the ogives (dotted
curves) show the probability of SSB , Blim and SSB, Bpa; blue curve, probability of F giving maximum catch; red curve, probability of
achieving maximum landings (FMSY) based on the number of populations with maximum catch or landings at the speciﬁed F. The cyan lines (c
and d) show the estimated value of FMSY (landings); for (c), this is based on the value of F giving the maximum mean catch; for (d), FMSY is
estimated as the median F from the probability distribution of F giving the maximum yield. The two methods for estimating FMSY are similar.
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An example comparing a plan and its outcome (Figure 2)
shows how the stochastic predictions relate to the outcome for
NS herring (Simmonds, 2007). In early years, the recruitment
and stock trajectories agreed fairly well with the predictions, but
then unforeseen environmental influences caused an unexpected
recruitment decline lasting for seven years, which adversely
affected the correspondence between predictions and outcomes.
In addition to the magnitude of the stock response, we may also
see changes in the spatial distribution, which compounded with
different fishery practices, may help to explain the outcomes.
For example, using the methodology of Bez and Rivoirard
(2000, 2001) for NS sole and plaice, there is significant movement
of plaice with age, but much less movement for sole (STECF,
2010a). These spatial differences between the two jointly fished
stocks opens up possibilities for spatial management, because
the F-ratios between sole and plaice are area-dependent.
HE of the effects of the multi-annual plan on the ecosystem
Ecosystem impacts of the different options of the plan might
include changes in discarding practices, bycatch rates, catches of
non-target species, and habitat degradation. Currently these may
be characterized through agreed indicators or descriptors that
are influenced by the options. In the longer term there will be a
role for multispecies modelling, first to understand the past,
then to predict the future, if the models are good enough.
Comparison with alternative scenarios
For HEs, a comparison between the outcome of the evaluated plan
and other management scenarios can be made using historical
re-evaluation (STECF, 2010a). Again NS herring is an example;
Simmonds and Anderson (2010) give historical stock projections
under different management scenarios (Figure 3), showing
similar stock trajectories but with less variability in catches.
Using a Ricker stock–recruit relationship, recruitment becomes
stock- and hence management-dependent (Figure 3). Fixed
multiplicative deviations by year mimic stock-independent
environmental effects on recruitment. The economic conse-
quences of these scenarios are compared in Simmonds and
Anderson (2010). The more-stable scenarios, with catches held
constant unless the target catch changes by 10 or 15%, would
have provided better overall economic performance than the
actual plan implemented.
Social and economic effects of the plan
Fleet information
The economic data necessary for HEs and IAs were collected under
the DCR until 2007 (EC, 2001) and the DCF from 2008 (EC,
2007). The data structure is based on national fleet segments speci-
fied in the regulation, and further divided into me´tiers, where
appropriate and possible. This well-defined structure would
suggest that the data are comparable between countries and fish-
eries. However, when the submission of data by fishers is volun-
tary, the data may be insufficient, especially those from
small-scale fishers who are unwilling or unable to deliver.
Sometimes only one or two companies form a fleet segment,
and because of confidentiality issues, their data cannot be pub-
lished. The basic European publication on economic data is the
Annual Economic Report (STECF, 2010d). For these data, avail-
ability and confidentiality issues are a concern.
If sufficient data are available, the main indicators for a multi-
annual plan HE are calculable: net profit, gross value added
(GVA), or total costs. A series of economic indicators have been
identified (Sabatella and Franquesa, 2004; STECF, 2007, 2009):
(i) value of landings  revenue from the sale of fish;
(ii) market price  ex-vessel prices and, where possible, prices
along the chain;
(iii) net profit  income less all costs, including capital costs;
Figure 2. Comparison of stochastic medium-term predictions of NS herring using data available in 1996 incorporating 10% assessment and
20% implementation biases (black lines 5, 25, 50, 75, and 95 percentiles) against the actual trajectories of population parameters 1996–2009
according to the 2010 assessment (grey dots and lines; ICES, 2010): (a) recruitment; (b) SSB; (c) ﬁshing mortality; (d) catch.
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(iv) GVA  the contribution to gross national product, i.e.
income minus all expenses except capital and crew costs;
(v) fleet size, composition, and value.
It is important to identify which indicators are appropriate for
the specific cases being assessed. However, it is likely that some of
these will be unavailable in some cases. The issue is that an appro-
priate scale of study is needed to allow a manageable fishery, with
sufficient economic information to describe an identifiable oper-
ational/manageable unit. If there are no specific economic or
social objectives in the plan, then we must use the very general
objectives of the CFP, making it nearly impossible to assess the
economic success of plans. In such cases, improvement in some
indicators may allow a claim for better economic performance,
but without appropriate objectives, no quantitative statement of
success is possible. For IAs lacking objectives, it is only possible
to show likely trends of indicators for different options.
Examples of such economic IAs include Vieira and Tull (2008)
and STECF (2010a, e, f); for examples of analyses of different
harvest strategies in the Western Channel sole fishery, see
Bjørndal and Bizabih (2010), and for a more general discussion
of single-species fisheries and uncertainty, see Sarkar (2009).
Processing sector
In the DCF, EU member states are also required to collect data on
the fish-processing industry which, in many countries, are already
recorded by the national statistical offices. Often, however, it is
only companies above a certain size (e.g. 20 or 50 employees)
that are required to deliver data. For the others, data may be
requested through voluntary questionnaires, providing the necess-
ary though possibly incomplete information. In 2009, STECF ana-
lysed fish-processing data for the first time, and published a report
on the sector (STECF, 2010g).
Information linking vessel landings with processing-sector
inputs is generally available through sales notes. Though poten-
tially helpful, this information has not yet been used for plan
evaluation. In the absence of such detail, one solution is to use
input/output multipliers to evaluate changes in the fishery in
terms of GVA and employment in the economy as a whole. The
different exploitation rates implied by the management options
in Figure 3 give different economic outcomes. Simmonds and
Anderson (2010) show that the original management strategy
gave the highest catches and landings, but the GVA approach
was better for the less variable strategies.
Social aspects
Social objectives have had limited attention within the CFP so far,
and in the context of fishery management, little has been done to
measure or include these explicitly in management targets. While
social objectives such as those of good environmental status (GES)
have become explicit, little has been done to set them at the level of
the individual fisher (Symes and Phillipson, 2009). At present, the
Figure 3. Alternative management scenarios, 1993–1999, showing predicted changes in (a) recruitment, (b) SSB, (c) mean F at ages 2–6, and
(d) total catch for NS herring under ﬁve scenarios. Blue, original management; red, constant-F management under the 1997 plan without error;
purple, constant catch of 420 000 t in all years; cyan and mauve, F-target for a constant catch unless the actual catch deviates by more than 10
or 15%, respectively.
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only social indicator requested in the DCF is the amount of
employment. There are no requirements to collect data on the
regional importance of the fishery sector, job alternatives, or
average salary compared with other sectors. Pollnac et al. (2007)
show a limited social analysis of fishery-management outcomes.
The key areas for social sustainability are the social consequences
of management targets, and choosing approaches that foster
cooperation, or have a high likelihood of compliance. Social indi-
cators can be employment (catching and other fishery sectors), or
the salary, to compare with non-fishery sectors (or the general job
market).
Again, one approach is to consider input/output multipliers to
estimate the overall impact on an economy, and on the potential
for employment that can be based on multipliers of the landings
value (Simmonds and Anderson, 2010).
Cost-effectiveness of control and enforcement
It is important to know whether different options have different
implementation costs about their effectiveness in delivering the
planned objectives. One option may deliver better conservation
measures than another at comparable costs, or another may have
similar conservation properties with differing costs. There is cur-
rently no methodology to provide a quantitative cost/benefit
analysis of control and enforcement. Models such as the integrated
fisheries management policy applied to groundfish off northwest
Canada (DFO, 2010) give some insight into the costs and benefits
of major monitoring programmes, with the total catch assessed
through a combination of observers, cameras, and self-sampling.
Transparency of information from fishers may be the key;
greater openness leads to greater trust, better compliance, and
more cost-effective enforcement. The use of incentives to reward
good behaviour, or successful results-based management, may
have lower control and enforcement costs, but still need good
data to ensure that the incentives are scaled appropriately, and
that the responsibilities and rewards are fair.
The data needs are the costs and effectiveness of enforcement,
the economic benefits of the fishery, the economic incentives
required to achieve better compliance, the costs and benefits of
applying and complying with certification schemes such as those
of the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC, 2010), KRAV (KRAV,
2010), or the Responsible Fishing Alliance (RFA, 2010).
Conclusions on HEs and IAs
HEs and IAs should be based on three main evaluation criteria:
(i) effectiveness: the ability to achieve the objectives (the most
likely to succeed);
(ii) efficiency: the cost-effectiveness (the best cost/benefit ratio)
(iii) consistency: the best trade-offs without major contradictions
across the economic, social, and environmental domains.
Time-scale and process
In carrying out an HE of multi-annual plans, the data flow needs
to be considered along with the questions that require answers.
HEs cannot be attempted before the relevant data are available.
A time-line (Figure 4) shows when differing types of information
become available after the plan has been agreed. Once the type of
HE has been selected, its timing is determined by the availability of
information. For example, an HE of three years of biological data
can be done around month 48, whereas three years of economic
evaluation must wait until month 60. The time-line (Figure 4)
deals only with data from EU member states, the EC, and ICES,
but in some cases fishery information from Regional Advisory
Councils may be available sooner.
Discussion: the future of management and data
collection
The key property of fishery management policy is that it acts by
controlling the human activity of harvesting fish resources.
Management actions are not aimed directly at the stocks, but
rather the response of the stock is a secondary result of managing
fishing activities. Therefore, IAs need to evaluate fishing activities
and their effect on the stocks, rather than thinking of fishery man-
agement as providing catch opportunities for fishers. This empha-
sis has certain consequences, discussed below.
First, consider the scale at which management should be
attempted. Management is currently directed at one or more
unit stocks that are supposedly independent; any interaction is
ignored. There is a need to identify overlaps of fleets and stocks,
grouping economic entities (fisheries or fleets) and their impacts
on particular stocks. Many European fleets catch the same
species from different stocks, sometimes during the same trip, so
an allocation of income by stock may be feasible, but separating
vessel costs that way is impractical, and economic management
by stock or me´tier is unworkable. Traditionally, fishers respond
to stimuli by moving between me´tiers, and removal of that
freedom could make fisheries less economically sustainable.
Choosing the correct scale will reduce the number of unresolved
issues hindering policy implementation. The scale will be region-
and fishery-dependent.
Second, sampling me´tiers to describe the variability of fishing
activities is attractive, but me´tiers are intrinsically dynamic
because they respond to changing fishing opportunities.
Therefore, sampling me´tiers on predefined criteria is hard to
implement, and it may create gaps as fishing practices adapt. We
think it better to detect and evaluate me´tiers retrospectively,
rather than to attempt to define them on a priori criteria. By
choosing to sample vessels, measuring their activity and
catch, the population to be sampled can be defined from a fleet
register.
Third, information needs to cover both catch (including dis-
cards) and landings. Modern technologies are needed to
monitor and verify catch data. Whereas landings form the econ-
omic component, catch is the basis for biological IAs. However,
landings and not catches are required for the parameter Y (the
yield) in the objective of fishing at MSY. Economists have reported
various consequences attributable to the separate consideration of
catches and landings, and the behavioural response of fishers to
specific incentives (see Hatcher, 2005, on quota management,
and Vestergaard, 1996, on discard/highgrading behaviour in the
Greenland shrimp fishery).
Fourth, we see the need to focus on a more harmonized bio-
logical and economic approach to data collection. The current
DCF framework has a strong bifurcation between the requirements
for biological and economic data, which currently cannot be
linked because the fleet definitions are not coherent. Spatial infor-
mation to link fleet numbers, costs, and fishing effort at an area
level is not yet fully available. Targets for biological sampling are
species- rather than fishery-based. Samples from different species
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do not come in a coordinated way from the same vessel, rather the
different species are likely to come from different vessels although
they are caught in a mixture. This species-based approach implies
an assumption of homogeneity in mixtures that may be erroneous,
and any correlation between biological characteristics among
species may be hard to determine. A compromise is required so
that fleet units need to be big enough to be fairly consistent, and
identifiable for management purposes, but small enough to be
spatially resolved to allow sampling at scales matching the
stocks. It is important to monitor and sample all the economic
components of fishing so that the full range of economic activity
can be linked to a biological impact. The current practice of not
sampling less significant groups results in a shortage of data for
understanding the development of different fisheries over time,
and allows gaps in knowledge to grow as new developments are
missed. Some might consider that new data-collection procedures
will disrupt the catch per unit effort (cpue) series used for stock
assessments or as trend indicators. However, collecting data on
one species in isolation may obscure an effort response in a fleet
that would be understood if more-coherent multispecies data
were available. Indeed, better understanding of cpue through
economic information could result in better tuning of data
time-series.
Finally, to augment a sampling programme approach, there are
various sources of fishery data, such as e-logbooks, VMS records,
and details on the economic performance of fishers, that would be
extremely helpful for guiding good management. Currently, these
data are often classed as confidential, but they need to be available
to be of any use. In this context, we consider that hidden data con-
tribute to distrust and aid non-compliance. One approach would
be to consider that participation in a TAC-controlled fishery
exploits a communal resource and therefore should oblige stake-
holders to participate in the science and to provide data access
accordingly.
Conclusions
There are explicit direct links between the policy objectives of the
CFP, the legislative procedures of the Lisbon Treaty, and the data
required to support fishery management and evaluation under
the DCF. These links explicitly include the need for HE and IA
of multi-annual plans. Comprehensive biological and economic
data are required at regional or subregional level, linked to man-
ageable fleet units. The definition of spatial and fleet units at the
appropriate scale for management by region would help to struc-
ture data-collection protocols to meet these needs.
Figure 4. Time-line of actions and information relating to the HE of management plans.
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